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Speech at the 46th Munich Security Conference - 02/07/2010

Speaker:MacKay, Peter G.
Function:Minister of National Defense
Nation/Organization:Canada


Fellow panellists,

I’m honoured to again join so many colleagues and friends at this distinguished forum.

Special thanks to Wolfgang Ischinger and the team in Munich for the invitation.

Like others here, I’ve just come from the NATO Defence Ministerial meeting in Istanbul, which makes for a timely discussion.

Sitting at the NATO table this week reminded me that this is a dynamic Alliance. Built on common values.  Common principles.  And on common, collective defence.

One that incorporates a diverse group of like-minded democracies – from longstanding allies like Turkey, to new members such as Albania and Croatia.

For 61 years now, NATO has been filling fundamental security roles for those within it – through Article Five and interoperability – military and political.

And NATO serves an invaluable security function to those outside it.

In Afghanistan, the Balkans and in our counter-piracy mission off the Horn of Africa - not to mention our strong and developing partnerships with friends from around the world – like Australia and New Zealand and many others – who have joined us, through ISAF, in support of United Nations Security Council resolutions. 

And while I’m extolling NATO’s virtues, I also very much recognise, in the interest of balance, the critical shortcomings and shortfalls of our Alliance.

Shortfalls in terms of agile, deployable capability, and in the need for modernization – to take us from the morse code to the Blackberry era.

Shortfalls in funding, on the one hand, but also wasted resources focused on old, unnecessary Cold War infrastructure and headquarters, instead of on current, vital operations.

Shortcomings in terms of the way we do our work – the dulling effect of the consensus rule on discussion and decisions, even down to the committee level. 

Today’s panel provides a great opportunity to talk about these issues as we work our way through, and toward, a new strategic concept.

The strategic concept exercise – and the work that experts are doing under your leadership, Ms. Albright – is extremely important.  Not as an end in itself.  But as a way of realizing NATO’s strategy for the future.

And so I want to lay down a few markers with regard to Canada’s priorities on this agenda.

Four priorities stand out in my view.

First:  let’s learn the lessons from operations.

The operational tempo of NATO operations has never been greater, more demanding or complex.

We haven’t got it perfect in Afghanistan.  But we have been adapting - to paraphrase no better a source than the Commander of ISAF, General Stanley McChrystal, we are beginning to see the beginning of success.

These painful operational learning experiences need to permeate our work on the strategic concept.

We now know that security and development are two sides of the same ‘coin’. 

We have to be comprehensive.  We need a whole of government effort – involving defence, development, and diplomacy. This is a necessary, integrated concept for our operations today and in the future. 

We must have true unity of effort – and unity of purpose. 

And not just in complex conflicts.  We are learning the same lessons again in our extensive relief mission in Haiti.

Efforts properly coordinated simply save lives and alleviate suffering and set the stage for longer term stability and security.

The comprehensive, fully integrated, approach has to become the new normal. 

Second, transformation.  Transformation must be dynamic.

We have to ensure that the priorities we have set are appropriate for the most likely, as well as the most demanding missions we are likely to encounter.

Transnational threats emanating from failed states will be a principal, although perhaps not the only, security preoccupation of allies in the years ahead.

We have to be agile.  We have to be deployable.  We have to be able to sustain our effort.

We have to share the burden and, frankly, not be coy about using multinational capabilities that we have invested in over the years – like AWACs, and in the future, AGS.

And as mentioned by previous speakers at this forum, we have to position ourselves in real and concrete ways to counter new and emerging threats – for instance cyber and energy security.

This doesn’t mean that NATO has to do it all.

Rather, we need to focus on our strengths, and work within a broader network of other effective international actors – such as the EU and the UN.

That brings me to point three – partnerships.

We must continue to build meaningful partnerships with those who are like-minded.  NATO is much more than just 28 allies.  It is a broader family of nations who are willing to fuse their political and military strengths in the interest of our common security.

Partnerships are integral to NATO’s ability to meet security challenges at a distance – just look at the more than 40 nations in ISAF in Afghanistan.

We must make the NATO-EU relationship more effective. There is potential for tremendous complementarity between our organizations.  We can’t afford the luxury of duplication of effort. 

Let us find a way to make sure that the counter piracy mission - until now, more of a competitive effort between NATO and the EU - develops into a model of how the EU and NATO can work together to produce maximum operational synergy. 

And then let’s work out how both NATO and the EU can operate smoothly and effectively with the United Nations in an integrated global team effort.

And partnership includes our open door policy. Our Alliance welcomes those nations who share our values and meet our requirements. 

Whether in the Balkans, or Ukraine or Georgia.

Recalling, of course, that membership has its privileges but also comes with its price of admission.

Finally, let’s use our review of the strategic concept to lay to rest the false dichotomy between article five and expeditionary operations.  The fact is that readiness for one should be synonymous with readiness for the other.

I believe the foundations and core principles of the Alliance remain strong – collective defence; the strong transatlantic link.

To conclude, let’s not over-intellectualise our work on the strategic concept.

Let’s keep it real world focused.

And let’s make sure we do not delay the urgent work currently on the Alliance agenda, such as fundamental financial and structural reform. We can and must move forward by meeting current challenges, even as we plan for the future.

At the end of the day, this must be a strategic concept that works not only on paper, but, more importantly, in a world of harsh and changing realities. This concept must give us the practical tools for results on the road ahead.

 

Thanks Nik.  I look forward to today’s discussion.

 


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