Monthly Mind February 2010 - Opening Pandora's Box - or contributing to the Obama vision?

In response to the recent report by Lord Robertson, who critisizes Germanys proposal to withdraw the remaining American nuclear weapons from German territory, Wolfgang Ischinger and Ulrich Weisser argue in the current Monthly Mind that this observation is as wrong as it is misleading.

A recent report “Germany opens Pandora’s box”, prepared by Lord Robertson, former Secretary General of Nato and two co-authors, criticizes the German proposal to withdraw the remaining American nuclear weapons from German territory as damaging not only to Germany, but to Nato as a whole.

The authors argue that the German proposal was driven more by populist sentiment than any long term strategic goal. This observation is as wrong as it is misleading. While the Robertson report is, in our view, based on political and strategic perceptions which are fundamentally outdated, the arguments presented merit a substantive response:

•    First, it would be a grave mistake for Nato and its members to cling to a cold-war perception of Russia as a potential aggressor and not as a strategic partner with whom we share common strategic interests. As we elaborate Nato’s future strategic concept, we should accept the imperative that security and stability in Europe in the 21st century is only possible with Russia and not against Russia. Nato must live up to the criteria of mutual trust and partnership established in the Nato-Russia Founding Act of 1997 if we want Russia to look at Nato and its enlargement not as a threat and security challenge, but as an opportunity. Recent Russian suggestions to take another look at the question of eventual Russian membership in Nato demonstrate that this opportunity exists.
•    Second, those who argue that a withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Europe would constitute a material change to Alliance defense commitments and would make European Nato members more vulnerable miss an important point. As early as 1987, Nato Foreign Ministers proposed significant reductions of short range nuclear weapons in their Reykjavik declaration. And when US-Secretary of Defense William Perry developed, 15 years ago, the famous formula that there is no need, no intention and no plan to deploy nuclear weapons to the new Nato member states, he correctly clarified that European Nato countries would be covered by the US nuclear umbrella regardless of whether or not nuclear weapons are stationed on their territory. Or, in other words: Extended defense does not require the physical presence of nuclear weapons on the territory of the countries covered.
•    Third, the Robertson report ignores the fact that the role and purpose of nuclear weapons has changed fundamentally. While nuclear weapons have deterred military conflict during the cold war, most military experts today agree that any residual benefits of nuclear arsenals are now overshadowed by the growing risk of proliferation and the related risk of nuclear terrorism. The word is nearing a “proliferation tipping point” when nuclear weapons spread beyond the capacity of any effort to rein them in and the danger increases that they will be used by a country in conflict or by accident, or by a terrorist group.

It is against this background that we should pursue a double track policy: Redefining nuclear deterrence and the needed capabilities, and developing a concept for nuclear arms control which reflects current political objectives and strategic realities. The fundamental question is: What action by whom needs to be deterred? What capabilities will be needed to credibly deter nuclear attack in the future?

The likelihood that political leaders in Bejing or Moscow would launch a surprise nuclear attack on the USA and her allies is close to zero. This assessment is also the basis for current efforts to further and significantly reduce American and Russian strategic nuclear weapons. In this context, sub-strategic nuclear weapons in Europe lose their purpose and their function for nuclear deterrence. Those weapons should therefore become subject to serious arms control initiatives. Such initiatives have to take into account that the US has several hundred operational nuclear warheads in Europe, compared to much larger numbers of Russian operational warheads for delivery by a variety of land-, air-, and sea based means.

In the past, Russia and the United States have been reluctant to include tactical weapons in bilateral nuclear arms reduction talks. Verification of strategic weapons is exercised through monitoring delivery vehicles. Tactical nuclear weapons use dual-purpose vehicles which makes verification much more complicated, and in the views of some, impossible.

Negotiations on the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe which might lead to the withdrawal of the remaining American tactical nuclear weapons should therefore be determined by three principles:

1.    The Alliance as a whole should reaffirm its reliance on the US nuclear umbrella and on extended deterrence – even after significant cuts as a consequence of further arms control agreements.

2.    Withdrawals should be based on the principle of reciprocity.

3.    Most easily verifiable would be the total elimination of tactical nuclear weapons by both sides. Because of concerns regarding potential threats on its southern flank, Russia may not be prepared for such a far-reaching step. A good alternative would be to move all tactical nuclear warheads from their forward bases deep inside national territory for centralized storage and make them subject to mandatory on site inspections. Withdrawing all tactical nuclear weapons rather than only some of them would make verification much easier. Moving these weapons to centralized storage sites will also ensure better physical protection from seizure by terrorists.

Finally, as the US and Russia commit themselves to non-proliferation, nuclear arms reductions, and  the vision of a nuclear-free world, such a proposal by European Nato members to reduce and withdraw tactical nuclear weapons  would be a limited, but important contribution to broadening this current bilateral effort to reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the word.

Ambassador Ischinger, a former Deputy Foreign Minister of Germany, is the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference.
Vice Admiral (ret.) Weisser was Director of the Policy Planning Staff, German Ministry of Defense.

A slightly abbreviated version of this essay appeared in the International Herald Tribune on February 15, 2010. 

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