I would like to thank all the other countries that have risked so much and sacrificed so much in the cause in Afghanistan. I want to also say how pleased I am that General Petraeus will be my unindicted co-conspirator in this venture going forward, and simply pose to all of you the question since he referred to me as a bulldozer. Who do you think is the real bulldozer on this stage?

NATO’s future is on the line here as well. And that’s why it’s appropriate we spend so much time on this. When I was offered this job, I saw no option but to accept it. After all, I don’t see how any American can turn down the President and the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser, our distinguished colleague, General Jones, who is here today, when they ask you to undertake one of our greatest challenges as your assignment. So I accepted it, but under no illusions at to its difficulties. There is no magic formula in Afghanistan. There is no date on agreement in Afghanistan. It’s going to be a long difficult struggle. And we require honesty and candor with the international public, the American public and ourselves to proceed.

What is required in my view are new ideas, better coordination within the U.S. government, better coordination with our NATO allies and other concerned countries -- and the time to get it right, as General Petraeus said.

More specifically, we need to understand what our goal is in Afghanistan.  Foreign Minister Qureshi’s eloquent statement which I think bears very careful study alluded to the events of 1989, a tragic failure on the part of the United States; and he might have added 2003 – another failure. We do not choose to repeat that in this administration.

As the President has said, this administration will not abandon Afghanistan but will seek to succeed there, with the help of our friends and allies. What we have inherited essentially is a situation with very grand rhetoric and inadequate and insufficient resources. General Petraeus who bridges the two administrations, a great soldier and a great partner, a man who has done such a great job in Iraq, has made clear today, as General McKiernan, in the past, that the military commanders feel their resources were inadequate. The civilian resources were also inadequate. What we seek, in the words of Secretary Gates, attainable objectives and more resources. A strategic review which General Jones referred to has been ordered by the President; and that review will address these specific issues.

So let me just outline the governing principles with which I would look at this problem. First of all, we often call the problem AfPak, as in Afghanistan – Pakistan. This is not just an effort to saved eight syllables. It is an attempt to indicate and imprint in our DNA the fact that there is one theater of war, straddling an ill-defined border, the Durand Line, and that on the western side of that border, NATO and other forces are able to operate.  On the eastern side, it’s the sovereign territory of Pakistan.  But it is there on the eastern side of this ill-defined border that the international terrorist movement is located. Al Qaeda and other organizations of its sort and we have to think of it that way, not to distinguish between the two. In this regard, I was very pleased with the private meetings that General Jones, General Petraeus, Jim Steinberg and I had with Foreign Minister Qureshi, in which he offered to set up a parallel group from Pakistan to join us in the strategic review.  General Jones indicated his pleasure at that offer and I will be pursuing that in more detail when I arrive in Islamabad tomorrow night on the first leg of a three country journey that will take me on to Afghanistan and then to India to get the views of the great Indian nation on these issues.

Secondly, as I said already, attainable objectives with adequate resources instead of the reverse. 

Third, a regional approach to the issue of Afghanistan.  All the neighbors of Afghanistan have roles in the history of Afghanistan.  That’s the history of this extraordinary country, which has always had a very clear identity despite its own internal ethnic diversity and yet because of its inherent weaknesses, has always been subject to the whims and pressures of its giant neighbors.  In the 19th century, this was famously called the “great game.” David Petraeus and I don’t like that phrase at all, and we don’t want to use it, but it is true that the neighbors, all the neighbors and some countries that don’t have direct borders play a role. And we are going to look for more of a regional approach.

And finally, more focus on Pakistan. Pakistan’s situation is dire, not just the problems in the federally-administered tribal areas but its economy which has suffered grievous blows recently. It needs international assistance, international sympathy and international support. A new and fragile democracy has emerged after years of military rule. But the situation in Pakistan requires attention and sympathy. And that is why I am starting my trip in your country and I am grateful for your suggestions.

With that I will conclude and just say that we look forward to the direct advice of all the countries represented here at the Munich Security Conference. We look forward to working closely with your government and we welcome President Karzai’s support. And I look forward to a very good discussion.