20.02.2010

MSC Booklet Paper No. 3: Reinvigorating the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: Towards a new consensus

Stephan Mergenthaler und Joel Sandhu widmen sich in Ihrem Beitrag der Zukunft des nuklearen Nonproliferationsregimes.

Growing threats from the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs as well as the prospects of nuclear terrorism make the case for a strong nuclear non-proliferation system more urgent than ever. But these acute crises as well as faded faith in the sincerity of the central bargain between nuclear haves and nuclear have-nots have brought the current regime to a critical tipping point. With the crucial review conference of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) this coming May, 2010 is a critical moment for decisive actions to promote a new global consensus on nuclear non-proliferation.

On balance, the nuclear non-proliferation regime has been a success story. It has prevented a rapid avalanche of proliferation. With only nine nuclear weapon states to date, 183 UN member states have eschewed acquiring such arsenals, including more than 40 countries with the technical ability to do so. Despite the persistence of more than 20,000 nuclear warheads worldwide, no nuclear weapon has been used in over 60 years. These remarkable achievements are increasingly under threat. To face the challenges of nuclear weapons in the 21^st century, the nuclear non-proliferation regime critically depends on universal acceptance of its underlying norms and principles. However, the suspicion that the regime merely exists to cement the dominance of the post-World War II powers and to prevent others from joining the club has gradually eroded its legitimacy as an impartial instrument for peace and security.

By emphasizing his support for nuclear disarmament, US President Obama has reaffirmed the US commitment to the NPT. Now he has to ensure that the position of the Pentagon and the upcoming nuclear posture review fully reflect the direction set by the US commander-in-chief. Combined with the initiation of negotiations with Russia for concrete reduction targets the new US posture offers a unique window of opportunity. It is a crucial first step, indicating that the US and Russia are ready to embrace their responsibilities as paramount nuclear powers. Unequivocal action towards complete abandonment of all nuclear weapons (“global zero”) is the only viable bond that can keep the global non-proliferation consensus intact by addressing long-held grievances of the nuclear have-nots.

This creates an opening to reinvigorate the nuclear non-proliferation system as a whole. The challenge in 2010 is to overcome the collective action dilemma that has paralyzed progress over the past decade: a deadlocked cycle of mutual suspicions and the shift of initiative to other parties. One-sided efforts on disarmament are unlikely to achieve success. The goal must be to assure equilibrium between all three pillars of the non-proliferation regime: disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful use of nuclear technology. To make this happen, second-tier as well as non-nuclear weapon states cannot afford to sit idly. They have an equally important role in making the new global nuclear governance consensus a success. Now that the US has taken the first step, the time for insisting that others go first on these critical issues is over.

This is where rising powers could make a decisive difference. China in particular has an important responsibility as both an established nuclear power and a leading power amongst developing countries. But also India as a nuclear power outside the non-proliferation regime as well as non-nuclear rising powers such as Brazil and South Africa enjoy influential positions within the Non-Aligned Movement. Whether they throw their weight behind hard-line sceptics of the non-proliferation regime such as Iran, Cuba and Venezuela by refraining from tough action against their attempts to spoil negotiations or contribute to seeking middle-ground between established camps will ultimately make or break the new non-proliferation consensus. Yet by supporting views that brand all responsibility for the lack of progress on the decadence of the paramount nuclear powers, rising powers are shying away from taking responsibility.

The road to progress is clear: Nuclear weapon states need to apply the same rigidity and transparency to their disarmament obligations they request for controlling non-proliferation; and measures for safeguarding peaceful use must unequivocally counteract suspicions of technology denial. The difficulty is that all these steps are interlinked. Striking a balance will therefore require far-reaching cooperation between established and rising powers as well as key non-nuclear weapon states from developing countries.

Concretely, this means that nuclear weapon states need to act on the positive momentum for disarmament initiated by US and Russian leadership and take steps to advance ratification of the treaties to stop nuclear testing and to end the production of fissile material. Beyond this, concerns of non-nuclear weapon states, including negative security guarantees and the implementation of nuclear weapon free zones, need to be addressed by more than mere open-ended declarations. In turn, non-nuclear weapon states and NPT non-signatories that reject the universalisation of stricter safeguards and verification measures need to realize that their resistance to greater transparency on non-proliferation only serves to hamper disarmament. If China, India, Brazil and South Africa, as rising powers, have a real stake in disarmament, they have to show more initiative to contribute to the conditions facilitating such steps.

This also includes dedicated support for innovative approaches to countering the proliferation risk inherent in peaceful use—an essential element of the new non-proliferation consensus given the rapid rise of global demand for nuclear energy. Various proposals based on multilateralizing the nuclear fuel cycle have met great suspicion by states in the Non-Aligned Movement. As largely Western initiatives, this scepticism is directly linked to the political rift within the non-proliferation regime. With its dual identity as an established nuclear power and leader of the Non-Aligned Movement, China plays a key role in addressing the concerns of states that see the debate on multilateral fuel cycle arrangements as merely another attempt to cement the division between haves and have-nots. A proactive stance from China would also call Western powers to task since only a clear commitment to the full internationalization of the fuel cycle activities of all states can be a viable governance vision that strengthens the overall non-proliferation regime.

Now is the time for joint leadership. So far, narrow-minded ideological fights between established groups have hindered progress. Established powers must deliver on their commitments; rising powers must embrace their new responsibilities. Only such joint leadership can bring about a new consensus strong enough to pull the regime from the daunting precipice.

Stephan Mergenthaler and Joel Sandhu are Research Associates with the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. Email: smergenthaler(at)gppi.net / jsandhu(at)gppi.net