21.02.2010

MSC Booklet Paper No. 4: Middle East Security: Toward a Decade of Progress?

Michael Schmidmayr und Thorsten Benner schlagen in ihrem Beitrag vor, Friedensverhandlungen im Nahen Osten vom Modell des KSZE-Prozesses inspirieren zu lassen.

Another war between Israel and Hezbollah, Gaza moving further toward a failed non-state, the Iraqi civil war refueled, Iran’s nuclear program triggering a regional arms race, human development indicators on the decline across the region. It does not take much imagination or audacity to argue that 2010 will be another dismal year for the Middle East. How could the story unfold differently? Could 2010 be the year that starts a decade of progress in this embattled region? To give this more positive scenario a chance, the key players should (re)start the search for a regional security architecture.

The rationale for this is simple: dealing with the region’s two hottest-button issues, the Arab-Israeli conflict and Iranian nuclear program, alone will not solve the region’s security problems. Both call for regional answers. And even if the Arab-Israeli conflict were over tomorrow, deep security problems such as the divide between Sunni and Shia dominated countries would continue to plague the Middle East. Therefore, the only promising path forward is a comprehensive regional security approach.

Any push in this direction would do well to learn from the failures of previous approaches to establish regional security systems in the Middle East. First, we need to consider the failure of unilateral approaches, such as the “democratization through regime change” effort led by the US administration under George W. Bush. This is just the last in a line of efforts by militarily superior external powers to remodel the Middle Eastern security system to their own image without lasting success – oftentimes creating turbulence and conflict rather than security. Second, we need to learn from past regionally driven efforts to establish (sub)regional security institutions. The Arab League’s defense system has never taken on any palpable form. While the Gulf Cooperation Council’s defense pact’s future is more promising, all these models share one key deficiency: they are too exclusive and keep key actors out (e.g. Israel or Turkey, and even more external actors such as the US or Russia). Likewise, the multilateral part of the 1991 Madrid conference, which represented the embryonic structure of a regional dialogue system, has not yielded substantive results. Existing global structures such as the UN have proven unable to guarantee regional security.

Some proposals have been made for new regional structures, drawing on the lessons learned from previous experiments and the shortcomings of existing institutions. One overarching lesson is clear: a gradual, confidence-building approach toward a regional security community is the only one with a chance of success. The CSCE/OSCE process can serve as a source of inspiration, giving up on the (unrealistic) idea of collective defense pacts and instituting fora for dialogue instead.

Such a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME) must be inclusive; no regional security initiative can afford excluding ‘difficult’ players. All states in the region (including those at the margins, such as Turkey) and key external actors (the U.S., the EU, Russia, maybe China) need to be on board.

Like in the Helsinki process, a general conference should establish the principles of engagement, maybe reproducing the famous ‘basket’ structure of the CSCE process. Most important, it should guarantee a minimum level of mutual recognition between the different parties. The formula for recognition needs to square two key concerns: the concern of authoritarian incumbents with the threat of external regime change and Arab states’ reluctance to recognize Israel. A resolution stressing the principle that regime change by force is not an option could be a viable compromise. This addresses the concerns of authoritarian incumbents while also covering Israel. Similar to the ten principles of the CSCE agreement reached in Helsinki in 1975, participants would agree on a range of other basic principles including a minimum definition of human rights.

To be sure, mutual recognition and the institution of some basic principles are a necessary first step, yet not a sufficient process per se. The process would need to prove itself step by step through concrete results: committees and subcommittees would contribute to building confidence, help melt intransigent positions and produce some tangible results. Annual or biennial general assemblies should endorse results, reward cooperative partners and set the agenda for the following period.

Who could sponsor efforts to create the CSCME? Any such organization or forum needs to be regionally driven but outside powers must play a supporting role. So far, regional actors have played on the basis of a zero-sum logic. To nudge them toward the win-win rationale of a comprehensive security arrangement, outside powers can bring in incentives, offering financial support and better political, trade and scientific relations.

However, while ownership of the dialogue structure would fall to regional players, its creation will most likely not take place without leadership from the outside. There lies the first and indispensable role for the US, the EU and possibly some other powers like Russia. They must convince their primary partners in the region – Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt – of the CSCME’s benefits, thus triggering momentum even more recalcitrant players could hardly ignore.

To be sure, starting such a process needs to go hand in hand with pushing for progress on the region’s two hottest security issues, the Iranian nuclear program and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Both need to be addressed in a broader regional context. In its dealings with Iran, other states in the region as well as external powers need to demonstrate that nuclear armament and threatening fellow UN member states is not an option. At the same time, they need to make it clear that, just like any other country in the world, Iran has legitimate interests for security, prestige and recognition. On this basis, negotiations should continue toward a bargain that includes the civil use of nuclear energy, security guarantees offered by the U.S. as well as perspectives for better long-term integration into a Middle East security architecture and into the global economy and global fora. As for the Arab-Israeli conflict and the question of Palestine in particular, the parties have to move beyond the failed roadmap and take steps toward a comprehensive bi- or multilateral settlement through an international conference. The parameters of such a settlement have been quite clear to the parties for a while. However, all conflict parties refuse to endorse them so far in their entirety, for various tactical as well as strategic reasons. The U.S., Europe and other outside powers would do well to clearly name this game: cheap bargaining strategies as well as proxy wars waged by players in the region at the expense of the peace process will no longer be tolerated.

Does pushing for a CSCME while dealing with the Arab-Israeli and Iranian question guarantee success? The better question is: what is the alternative? Tragically, the past decade has set the bar for success in the Middle East very low. For the region to have a fighting chance to escape its vicious cycle of insecurity, there is no alternative to advancing a regional security architecture.

Michael Schmidmayr is a lecturer and Associate Director for International Relations at the French-German Campus of Sciences Po Paris as well as a fellow with the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin. Thorsten Benner is co-founder and Associate Director of the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin.