20.02.2010

MSC Booklet Paper No. 2: European Security: Moving Toward a Warmer Peace

Thorsten Benner und Raphael Bossong fordern in ihrem Hintergrundpapier, 2010 neue Anstrengungen zu unternehmen, eine umfassende europäische Sicherheitsarchitektur zu schaffen.

In his speech to the 1998 Munich Security Conference then NATO Secretary-General, Javier Solana proclaimed “the end of the Post-Cold War era. What we have put in its place is a new strategic consensus - a strategic consensus on the main pillars of our security in the next century.” The twelve years since have made it painfully clear that Solana’s consensus was little more than a mirage. The Post-Cold War era has produced a cold peace at best and is anything but over. The countries of Greater Europe, including Russia, the post-Soviet successor states and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, do not share a consensus on organizing security. Europe, the US and Russia have found themselves at loggerheads over NATO expansion as well as Kosovo. The hot war in Georgia was the sad culmination of a steady deterioration. 

What is more, even within the European Union there are few traces of a "strategic consensus" on a European security architecture. The relations and division of labor between NATO, the EU, the OSCE are still very much contested. New EU members from Central and Eastern Europe put a premium on NATO as a bulwark against what they perceive as looming Russian aggression. This often puts them at odds with the security outlook of countries such as Spain, France and Germany. The rift right in the middle of Europe impairs the EU’s ability to develop a common security identity and live up to its global ambitions and responsibilities.

Twenty years following the end of the cold war this is a sobering diagnosis. It is all the more crucial to make 2010 the year of renewed efforts to establish the foundation for a warm peace: a comprehensive European security architecture that is shared by the US and Russia. Both the Obama administration and the Russian government have prepared the ground for such an initiative. Exactly one year ago, the US Vice President invoked the “reset button” for the relationship with Russia. Russian President Medvedev reciprocated with conciliatory language toward the US and the EU while fleshing out his proposals for a "European Security Treaty".

The West should not waste this opportunity by rebuffing the Medvedev proposal out of hand. There are only two clean options: Either present NATO members offer Russia the prospect of membership or they rule out further enlargement. But they cannot continue with the enlargement process while de facto ruling out the membership of only one country, namely Russia. This position only serves to embolden the revisionist and ultranationalist forces within Russia who have not come to terms with Russia’s loss of an empire and seem to see the role of the paranoid spoiler as the only one that is left for Russia. Instead of playing into the hands of these forces whose views already hold too much sway in the Kremlin’s halls of power, European countries should take up Medvedev’s invitation to have a serious discussion on a pan-European security architecture.

Ritualistic charges of appeasement against the voices who demand to give it serious consideration are misplaced. After all, the initiative could provide an urgently needed focal point for long-term confidence-building. It was as a mistake for Europe to wait that long with a substantial response after the initial Russian proposal in 2008. Europe should have used the opportunity to fill a decidedly vague initial idea with its own proposal. Without any European input, Russia has by now tabled a full draft. This draft which contains a number of provisions that are unacceptable for most Europeans has received a rather lukewarm response. In particular, the idea of a legally binding provision on the principle of indivisible security is a red rag that could quickly scupper the chances for a productive discussion process.

But it would be all too easy to use this element of the Russian proposal as a pretext for not entering into any serious negotiation. After all, negotiations are about coming to terms with different viewpoints. At the same time, there are too many issues in the neighborhood that urgently require cooperation with Russia for Europe to forgo this opportunity.  The general elections in Ukraine could fuel antagonism between the Russia and the West. Georgia also threatens to flare up again, as the international status of South Ossetia and Abkhazia remains unresolved. Several other “frozen conflicts” as well as organized crime are additional issues of mutual concern and potential conflict.

One thing should be clear: any pan-European security architecture that could address these issues can only profit from a strong European Union at its core. There are two steps EU members should take in this direction. First, work on the strategic rift within Europe vis-à-vis Russia that paralyzes the EU and regularly poisons dealings with Russia (and the US). As the natural linchpin between West and East, Germany has a particular role to play as a facilitator for bridging this divide. While any such effort is an uphill struggle at best, there is no alternative to pushing hard for finally addressing this divide.

Second, the EU should push forward with building capacity in the diplomatic, civil, humanitarian and military realms that make up today’s peace and security apparatus. With the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty EU members should finally bury the symbolic beauty contest about whose vision for Europe holds more sway and focus on creating operational capabilities. Thus, the EU could relieve NATO and get serious about conflict prevention and management in its neighborhood.

A united and strong EU core can then underpin discussions involving US and Russia and other countries of Greater Europe on the shape of a common security architecture. The US no longer denies that a strong foreign and security capacity of EU is also in its interest. To make the growing security role of the EU acceptable to Russia, the two partners need to keep working on social and economic integration against all obstacles. The EU should take President Medvedev by his word in his renewed emphasis on modernization and more accommodating stance towards the EU’s Eastern Partnership.

Cooperating on issues in the EU’s neighborhood will help to rebuild trust between Europe, Russia and the US. This is badly needed for enabling cooperation on issues beyond the EU neighborhood (Iran, Afghanistan and the broader Middle East). Serious dialogue and cooperation are the only way to move from the zero-sum game of spheres of influence to the positive-sum logic of areas of common responsibility. 2010 should be the year to establish the foundation for finally moving beyond the post-cold war era toward a warm peace.

Thorsten Benner is co-founder and Associate Director the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, Raphael Bossong is a research associate with GPPi.