06.03.2010

Sam Nunn: Memorandum für die NATO Group of Experts über die Nuklearstrategie der NATO

In einem Memorandum für die NATO-Expertengruppe fordert Sam Nunn, Co-Vorsitzender der Nuclear Threat Initiative, die Rolle von Nuklearwaffen in der NATO-Strategie neu zu bewerten.

MEMORANDUM FOR: NATO Group of Experts

FROM: Sam Nunn

SUBJECT:  NATO Nuclear Policy

DATE: February 22, 2010

The revision of NATO’s Strategic Concept provides an historic opportunity for NATO to reevaluate its role in trans-Atlantic security and ensure the alliance remains both relevant and sustainable in the years ahead. In this context, long-standing positions with regard to U.S. and NATO nuclear declaratory policy and U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe will inevitably arise and should be reassessed in light of evolving threats and opportunities for improving U.S. and NATO security. Indeed, now twenty years after the Cold War ended, NATO governments and publics will expect if not demand that NATO reexamine the role of nuclear weapons in NATO security and the risks and benefits associated with maintaining the status quo, as well as initiating change.

Strategic Context with Russia

NATO nuclear policy issues, however, do not exist in a security or political vacuum. If we are to be successful in dealing with the hydra-headed threats of emerging new nuclear weapons states, proliferation of enrichment, poorly secured nuclear material and catastrophic terrorism – many nations must cooperate. We must recognize, however, that these tasks are virtually impossible without the cooperation of Russia. It is abundantly clear that Russia itself faces these same threats and that its own security is dependent on cooperation with NATO and the United States.

Russia’s erosion of conventional military capability has led it to increase dependency on nuclear weapons, including tactical battlefield nuclear weapons. And Russia has stated – as NATO did during the Cold War – that it may use nuclear weapons first. So now battlefield nukes are still in vogue and both Russia and NATO now reserve the right to use nuclear weapons first, even if not attacked with nuclear weapons. Together, are we inadvertently and unthinkingly headed “back to the future?”

Winston Churchill once said – “however beautiful the strategy – you must occasionally look at the result.” I believe that NATO, the United States and Russia must look at both the trajectory and the results of our current policies.In the years ahead, we must address a fundamental question: does NATO want Russia to be inside or outside the Euro-Atlantic security arc? The same question, of course, must be asked by the Russians. If our answer is outside, then it’s simple – we both just keep doing what we are now doing. This will inevitably lead us back to the future in terms of both risks and resources. If the answer is inside, we and Russia must make adjustments in strategy and tactics informed by answering, at least, the following questions:

A: From NATO’s perspective, does the expansion of membership to new states obligate us to incur enormous increases in defense budgets or be forever committed to Cold War concepts of deterrence, including the possible first use of nuclear weapons? Are we really examining the security implications of expansion over the long term or has expansion primarily become a political exercise?

B: From a Russian perspective, is it wise to keep pressuring its neighbors so they hurry to join the strongest alliance available today – in the form of NATO? Ratcheting up the pressure in various ways on Ukraine or Georgia does not encourage those countries to work with Moscow. Instead, it drives them to seek NATO’s protection. Is this what Russia really wants?

C: Can Russia avoid the temptation to employ its emerging energy superpower status to achieve political ends? Will it become a reliable and responsible market participant following the rule of law?

D: Are we and Russia destined to continue the assumption that Russia will always be outside the Euro-Atlantic security arc?

Nuclear Security in Europe

Turning to the nuclear security side of the ledger – almost twenty years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, we continue to live with a risk of a catastrophic nuclear accident that is greater than “zero” – and higher than it should be with the end of the Cold War. Indeed, the risk of accidents is not much lower – and may even be higher – than existed when the United States and Soviet Union were strategic adversaries. This problem stems largely from persistent concerns over Russian early warning, command and control and force posture – and the manner in which U.S. policies might in some ways inadvertently compound the risk.

In order to reduce the risk of a mistaken nuclear launch to as close to “zero” as possible, the U.S. and Russia should as a high priority pursue steps to increase warning and decision time for U.S. and Russian leaders. Such steps could include a mix of joint / bilateral and unilateral measures relating to U.S. and Russian early warning (beyond the building and staffing of a Joint Early Warning Center), command and control, and force posture – including reductions in warheads on prompt launch status. Long overdue cooperation on missile defense should also be a high priority. And we must also find a way to deal with perceptions relating to conventional force postures and deployments – another factor behind Russia’s current nuclear posture.

Russia too has a vital interest in the security of tactical nuclear weapons – those in its 2

possession, and those possessed by other nations. Russia of course retains a large stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons estimated to be in the thousands, and many of these weapons are deployed in Europe. These warheads are distributed throughout the Russian armed forces – ground, air defense, air and naval – located at both operational bases and central storage.

This then is the broader security and political vortex within which NATO nuclear issues are important components. We need initiatives and actions on a much broader security and political front in order for NATO initiatives and actions on nuclear policy to have the greatest impact on improving collective security. It is also true that NATO nuclear issues will be viewed by governments and publics as an important signal as to whether the United States and NATO are serious about taking steps to reduce the role and relevancy of nuclear weapons in its broader security strategy. Moreover, initiatives in the area of NATO nuclear policy might also provide some needed ballast to U.S.-NATO-Russian relations and nuclear threat reduction more broadly.

Accordingly, the NATO Group of Experts should reconsider the U.S. and NATO position on tactical nuclear weapons and declaratory policy. Specifically, I would encourage you to examine an initiative where the U.S. and NATO, in coordination with Russia, would move to create greater transparency, accountability and consolidation of both U.S. and Russian tactical nuclear weapons inventories to enhance their security from any potential theft or seizure as a step toward their elimination, as well as exploring ways to reduce the importance of nuclear weapons through changes in declaratory policy. This could set a solid foundation for a new direction in U.S., NATO and Russian nuclear policies. Importantly, it would also provide a basis for a new process of engagement with Russia, with the goal of adopting parallel policies on accountability, transparency, consolidation and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons.

Finally, the political aspects of NATO nuclear policies remain important: any initiative to change declaratory policy or U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe would have to be done in careful coordination with NATO in a way that preserves shared risks and responsibilities among members of the NATO alliance. Moreover, I would underscore again that any NATO initiatives on declaratory policy or U.S. tactical nuclear weapons deployed in Europe would be most effective in the context of declaratory actions by the U.S. and NATO on a broader security and political front.

For many years, I have made the case that reducing the dangers posed by nuclear weapons is “the” most important issue in national security and foreign policy today. But progress on these issues cannot take place in the absence of progress on a much broader agenda – and that front includes NATO policies writ large, our relationship with Russia, and tangible cooperation among nations to reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear threats.

In that context, I would highlight the following questions related to changing the nuclear status quo within NATO for discussion:

1. What is the value of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to the NATO Alliance militarily? Politically?

2. Can nuclear risks and burdens continue to be shared by the Allies with the consolidation and eventual elimination of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe?

3. To what extent is Russian reciprocity necessary in order for NATO to take further steps on tactical nuclear weapons? What would be the political implications for the Alliance if one or more of the nuclear host countries were to unilaterally call for the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons due to domestic considerations (including upcoming decisions regarding DCA renewals).

4. Is the continuing threat of nuclear first use necessary to deter or defeat existing or emerging threats to NATO security, including the threat of nuclear terrorism? Can Russia be encouraged to make consistent and coordinated responses? How valuable a signal would it be in terms of underscoring a U.S. and NATO contribution to reverse reliance on nuclear weapons globally if the U.S. and NATO were to adopt a new declaratory policy that further reduced the importance of nuclear weapons?

5. How can NATO play a positive role on the question of increasing warning and decision time for national leaders in both the conventional and nuclear arenas?

6. Are we confident that US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are safe and secure and protected from theft and sabotage?

7. What are Russian incentives and motivations for the continued deployment of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe – and to what extent do these incentives and motivations tie to NATO policies, including NATO nuclear and conventional force postures? Can NATO and Russia find ways to work together to reduce the risks of these destabilizing nuclear weapons as well as the risks of these weapons getting into the hands of terrorists?

8. Can NATO conventional forces be deployed in a way that reduces the perceived threat to Russia, in particular to the perceived threat to their nuclear deterrent? Can Russian forces be deployed in a way that reduces the perceived threat to states that are located in proximity to Russia? How does the adapted CFE Treaty or other possible arrangements play into this equation?

9. Can NATO and Russia move toward a cooperative concept of increased warning and decision time making both conceptual and operational changes in both strategic and tactical nuclear postures as well as cooperation on missile defense and non-threatening conventional force deployments?

Sam Nunn ist Co-Chairman und Chief Executive Officer der Nuclear Threat Initiative. Von 1972 war er US-Senator für Georgia. Das Memorandum können Sie als PDF-Datei hier herunterladen.