Amano, Yukiya

 

---

 

The question posed by the title of this session - "Is Zero Possible?" - is not an easy one to answer. Perhaps we may put the question in a slightly different way - "How Can We Make Zero Possible?"

 

In my view, we need to take actions on many fronts simultaneously in order to make Zero possible.

Firstly, nuclear disarmament should be vigorously pursued by all the NPT Nuclear Weapon States, with the aim of eliminating their nuclear arsenals according to Article VI of the Treaty. All other States possessing nuclear weapons must also reduce their nuclear arsenals and work towards their complete elimination.

In addition, progress in several areas would be very helpful: the success of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, the follow-up to the START Treaty, the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the conclusion of a Fissile Material Cut-0ff Treaty arc some examples.

 

Secondly, we need to strengthen our efforts to prevent further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A very effective step would be universal adherence to the Additional Protocol to the comprehensive safeguards agreements between the IAEA and our Member States.

There is no legal obligation to conclude the Additional Protocol, but only with an Additional Protocol in force can the Agency declare with reasonable confidence that all of a country‘s nuclear activities are for exclusively peaceful purposes.
Use of new technologies in the Agency‘s inspections would be another practical step to strengthen verification capabilities. This, for example, would make the Agency more efficient in carrying out inspections of enrichment and reprocessing facilities.

 

Multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle may also require serious consideration.
If we can strengthen confidence and built momentum for nuclear disarmament and nonproliferation through such measures, then ideas which today may be considered unrealistic or very difficult may in time appear to be practicable, including “Zero“.

Ladies and gentlemen,

In order to achieve the elimination of all nuclear weapons, effective and credible verification of both non-proliferation and disarmament will be needed. As we come closer to “Zero“, the importance of verification will increase, and the IAEA may have a role to play in disarmament in addition to its existing work in verifying nonproliferation.

 

As regards nuclear disarmament, the Statute of the Agency stipulates that it shall “conduct its activities . . . in conformity with policies of the United Nations furthering the establishment of safeguarded worldwide disarmament.“
The Agency has relevant experience. After South Africa renounced its nuclear weapon programme in 1992 and joined the NPT as a nonnuclear-weapon State, the Agency verified that its weapon programme had been terminated.

However, the core strength of the Agency remains its ability to detect the misuse of nuclear materials through verification. In a nuclear weapon-free world, there may be a need for more intensive and intrusive verification, covering materials, equipments and facilities.

In addition, effective security measures will always be essential to prevent nuclear and radioactive materials from falling into the wrong hands.
lt is, of course, premature to predict future arrangements.

But whatever the future holds, the Agency would clearly continue to play a key role in a world free of nuclear weapons.

 

---

Es gilt das gesprochene Wort!